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The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effects of economic differentiation on 
worker earnings in Korea, We argue that the export-promotion policies of the state 
have substantially reduced segmentation of labor markets. The export promotion 
strategy functions to counteract industry and size effects on worker earnings and 
flattens wage differentials between the core and the periphery economic sectors. 
This result reflects the state's objective of removing the impact of institutional 
non-market forces on the process of earnings determination and preserving the 
market-pricing mechanism in labor markets. This does not mean that all forms of 
segmentation have been liliminated. The export promotion policy has led to a new 
structural inequality based on the division of the economy into a sector oriented 
toward production for export and a sector oriented toward production for domestic 
consumption. This is an inevitabie outcome of an export-promotion policy de-
signed to maximize labor productivity. 
INTRODUCTION 
1 
The South Korean (henceforth, Korea) state has emphasized scale eco-
nomy and strategic industries since its radical transition to the export-
promotion strategy (henceforth, export strategy) in the middle of the 1960s. 
The development-oriented state has treated employers unequally, allocating 
economic resources and deciding the access to policy benefits under the ban-
ner of maximizing 'plan-rationality' (Johnson 1982). As a result, product mar-
kets have been sharply divided in mUltiple ways: light vs. heavy industries, 
large vs. small firms, strategic vs. nonstrategic industries, and so on. Particu-
larly in the late 1970s, Korea reached the same level of industrial concentra-
tion as that of Japan. In theory, the high degree of segmentation in product 
markets gives rise to a sharp division in labor markets. 
According to theorists of labor segmentation (see Averitt 1968; Edwards 
'This paper was presented at the ASA meeting, San Francisco, 1989. 
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1979; Gordon, Edwards, and Reich 1982), economic growth advances structu-
ral segmentation in labor markets along with economic dualism. Monopoly 
capitalism has been firmly based on the process of generating worker divi-
sions with the increasing trend to bureaucratization of industrial organiza-
tions. Interestingly, however, the multiple division of product markets led to 
less structural segmentation of labor markets than was expected. On the 
contrary, structural segmentation in labor markets l has been m~rkedly re-
duced during the period of high-speed growth. Thus, the Korean experience 
is quite the opposite to this growing trend toward labor segmentation in 
advanced capitalism: size wage effects have steadily declined and industry 
wage effects have also been reduced throughout the past two decades of 
economic expansion. 
The central aim of this paper is to account for the decreasing effects of 
economic segmentation on worker earnings in the presence of the sharp and 
persistent divisions of product markets. It is argued that the state has substan-
tially reduced economic segmentation of labor markets by carrying out ex-
port-promotion policies. The export strategy functions to counteract industry 
and size effects on worker earnings and flattens wage differentials between 
the core and the periphery economic sectors. Particularly for semi-skilled 
workers, who form the main work force in manufacturing industries in Korea, 
the wage effects of economic segmentation are entirely eliminated, and thus 
worker wages are totally dependent upon personal endowments. This result is 
congruent with the state goal of removing institutional nonmarket forces in 
the process of earnings determination and preserving the market-pricing 
mechanism in labor markets. However, the export strategy has led to a new 
structural inequality based on market division, which is an inevitable outcome 
of the export strategy per se, which is designed to maximize labor produc-
tivity. 
EXPORT STRATEGY AS A STRUCTURAL DETERMINANT OF 
LABOR MARKETS 
Most sociological research on labor markets has focused on structural 
effects on individual socioeconomic attainment. The so-called paradigmatic 
shift (S0rensen 1986) of the sociology of labor markets is the theoretical and 
'In this study, economic segmentation refers to the dualism of core-periphery economic sectors 
(see Bibb and Form 1977; Beck, Horan, and Tolbert 1978; Hodson 1979; Tolbert, Horan, and 
Beck 1980). 
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methodological attempt to highlight structural agents and to measure their 
effects on labor market outcomes. Kalleberg and Berg (1987) recapitulate the 
multivariate approaches of "the new structuralism," classifying structural fac-
tors into six broad categories: state, class, occupation, industry, business 
organization, and union. Surprisingly, studies on the role of the state in labor 
markets are quite rare. 2 
Dealing with economic segmentation in an attempt to elaborate Averitt's 
concept of the dual economy (Averitt 1968), a few studies introduce transac-
tions between firms and the state as a proxy for state intervention (see Kal-
leberg, Wallace, and Althauser 1981; Baron and Bielby 1984; Wallace and 
Kalleberg 1981). A limitation of these efforts is that firms's transactions with 
the state reveal only a minor part of the whole relationship between firms 
and the state. The role of the state has never been fully treated as a strong 
independent variable in most multivariate regression models, in which state-
related variables appear only as part of a grouping of economic variables. 
The central aim of the present analysis is to bring the state into the earn-
ings process of industrial workers. The Korean state as a central institution of 
export-promotion policy has exerted an enormous influence on labor market 
outcomes for the past two and a half decades. In order to achieve rapid 
economic growth through exploring the world export market, the state mono-
polizes political and economic power to allocate economic resources unevenly 
to industries and firms. The prosperity of enterprises and the growth and 
decline of industries are completely dependent upon the state's discretionary 
power because the state lays out and decides firms' access to subsidies and 
institutional protection. In short, the state has favored exporting industries 
and firms in allocating economic and institutional benefits to a greater extent 
than those manufacturing goods for domestic consumption. Owing to these 
diversified benefits from the state, exporting firms are far more dynamic than 
domestic-market-oriented firms in Korea. Exporting firms are in an advan-
tageous position to attract advanced technology and update their information, 
thus exceeding otherwise comparable firms in productivity and profits. These 
advantages might logically be linked and transferred to better working condi-
tions of the labor force in exporting firms. Surprisingly, however, thesc 
advantages result in worse working conditions compared to domestic-market-
oriented firms. From the neoclass1cal point of view it is. difficult to explain 
how the advantageous position of exporting firms in Korea turns out to be 
dctrimental to worker earnings. These phenomena result in an unique struc-
2Theories of social insurance programs and welfare policy seem to provide valuable insights for 
studies on the role of the state in labor markets (see Flora and Heidenheimer 1984; Erikson, 
Hansen, Ringen, and Unsitalo 1987; Jacobs, Kohli, and Rein 1987). 
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ture of labor markets compared to what has been described regarding econo-
mic segmentation in advanced capitalism. 
Most studies of labor markets take industry and size as structural elements 
of dualism, e.g., of the dual economy and dual labor markets in industrial 
society. Inter-industry wage differentials have been fairly stable over a long 
span of time,. promoting a sharp division between high-wage and low-wage 
industries in both advanced and developing capitalist countries (Lang and 
Leonard 1987). In a similar vein, many studies suggest that income inequality 
and job tenure are strongly related to economic scale and establishment size. 
These two economic variables are widely used to define economic segmenta-
tion. There has been a growing literature on taxonomies of the core-
periphery economic sectors to capture the structural impacts on labor market 
process (Bibb et aJ. 1977; Beck et aJ. 1978; Hodson, 1979; Tolbert et af. 1980; 
Hodson and Kaufman 1981; Zucker and Rosenstein 1981). 
In this regard, of many structural factors generating economic segmenta-
tion, the present analysis concerns two economic variables, industry and firm 
size, in the context of 'the export-promotion policy' in Korea. The analysis 
will estimate the effects of economic segmentation on worker earnings and 
compare them with those in the United States. The analysis provides empiric-
al evidence for the main argument that the export strategy has substantially 
suppressed the wage effects of economic segmentation, while constructing a 
new structural inequality by market division in the working-class labor 
market. 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND VARIABLES 
Models of Earnings Equations 
The analysis of this section focuses on measuring the effects of the export 
strategy on wage determination. To this end, we construct a basic model of 
the earnings equation; containing four variables of individual endowments 
and three structural variables as follows: 
In (Earnings) = f (PE, 1, ES, MV), where, 
In (Earnings): Natural logarithm of hourly earnings, 
PE : Personal endowments, such as schooling, firm-specific experience, sex, 
and job skill, 
I : Industry. 
ES : Establishment size in terms of number of employees, 
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MY : 'Market division' is used as a proxy for the state's export strategy. 3 
'Market division' refers to the division of firms by market types between 
domestic-market-oriented firms and export-market-oriented firms according 
to the 'extent of firm involvement in export markets. ,4 
This basic model is the foundation of a three-fold analysis. First, the 
pooled model explains the relative importance of each variable in earnings 
determination, indicating the percentage change of worker earnings for a unit 
change of independent variables in the equation. Human capital is contrasted 
to structural variables in terms of the variance explained and the regression 
coefficients. The first analysis shows that human capital, rather than structu-
ral variables, becomes predominant in wage determination. The preponder-
ance of human capital in wage determination is an intended consequence of 
the export strategy. 
The second stage of analysis measures the effects of economic segmentation 
on worker earnings, in order to examine the patterns and structural sources 
of earnings inequality. It will focus on the varying size and significance levels 
of regression coefficients of industry and firm-size variables, with control for 
the wage effects of the extent of firm involvement in the export market. The 
analysis then proceeds to highlight' the function of the export strategy in 
suppressing the impacts of economic segmentation. 
The third stage of analysis demonstrates the emergence of a new structural 
segmentation due to the export strategy. It will show that, instead of suppres-
sing the effects of economic segmentation, the export strategy makes the 
market division the predominant structural source of earnings determination. 
Data Sources 
This analysis uses the Survey of Labor Demand Behavior of Korean Manu-
facturing Firms (henceforth, SLOB), which the Economic Institute of Seoul 
National University conducted in cooperation with the International Labor 
Organization (ILO) in 1976. This survey data contains all information re-
quired for our pooled model. The SLOB investigates working conditions and 
job-related information in manufacturing industries in the Kyong-In Industrial 
Belt. This industrial belt, located around metropolitan Seoul and built up 
since the Japanese colonial period, is best suited for analyses of the develop-
ment pattern of the Korea economy due to its amalgamated structure of old 
3Simply put, the export strategy is characterized by the state effort to push capitalists to the 
forefront of export. The Korean government rigidly defined 'firm's esport record' as a major 
criterion of allocating economic and institutional benefits (see Krueger, 1979, pp.185-190). 
4In the present analysis, this term refers to 'the ratio of firm exports to total production.' 
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and new, and small- and large-scale firms. The SLDB contains 1,115 respon-
dents selected from 271 firms. 
Defining Variables 
Variables in the analysis are defined and operationalized as follows. The 
logarithm of hourly earnings is used as the dependent variable in all equa-
tions. Hourly earnings are obtained by dividing regular monthly earnings by 
total hours worked. Regular monthly earnings for production-line workers are 
mainly composed of base pay and overtime pay.5 In addition, there are three 
groups of independent variables, as described below. 
The first group of independent variables is that of personal endowments. In 
consideration of the importance of credentialism in a meritocratic society such 
as Korea, years of schooling are classified into four categories, elementary 
school, middle school, high school, and college. Firm-specific experience is 
also defined as a categorical rather than a continuous variable, divided into 
one- or two-year intervals. Sex is scored 0 for males and 1 for females. The 
level of skill and kinds of licenses are uscd to defiilc job skill, yielding five 
categories: unskilled laborers, apprentices, semi-skilled workers, skilled work-
ers, and craftsmen. 
Regarding the economic variables of industry and size, industries are first 
grouped into two categories, durables and nondurables, on the basis of the 
three-digit c1assificaton in the SLDB dataset.6 Establishment size is measured 
by the number of employees, categorized and scored 1 = 5-49, 2 = 50-199, 3 = 
200-499, 4=500 and so on. Actual analyses, however, use a dichotomous 
variable between large and small firms, since the preliminary regression 
analysis shows no significant wage gaps between the former two categories of 
firms on the one hand, and between the latter two categories of firms on the 
other. The small-firms variable combines 1 and 2 above, including firms with 
199 or fewer employers, while that for large firms combines 3 and 4, includ-
ing firms with 200 or more employees. The industrial groupings and size 
categories are used to create a core-periphery dichotomy similar to the tax-
~Regular monthly earnings in the SLDB data refer to total monthly earnings ,as of June 1976, 
when the survey was conducted. Although the payment scheme in Korea is extremely compli-
cated, the relative simplicity of the payment scheme for production-line workers relieves the 
difficulty. 
'The durables are basic metal, machinery, chemicals and petroleum, and non-ferrous and 
non-metallic minerals; the. remaining five industries are classified as nondurables, e.g., textile and 
apparel, wood and furniture, paper and printing, food and beverage, and other 'miscellaneous 
manufacturing industries. 
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onomies of economic segmentation (ct. Tolbert et al. 1981).7 
The market divisionis based on a continuous variable for the extent of firm 
involvement in export market or the ratio of firm exports to total production. 
For analytical purposes, there are three kinds of firms, as defined by their 
sales markets: firms producing goods only for domestic consumption (DC), 
firms producing goods for both domestic and export markets at similar prop-
ortions (DE), and firms producing goods mainly for export markets (EX). 
Although international trade economists use a slightly different definition, 
our conceptualization is rather well suited to investigating the impact of the 
export-promotion strategy on labor markets, since firms' export ratios arc a 
more useful indicator of their relatedness to the state. 8 The first two kinds of 
firms share many similarities but are very distinguishable from export-
concentrating firms in many respects. For this reason, the present analysis 
mainly uses a dichotomous market division, contrasting the domestic-market-
oriented (DMO) firms to the export-market-oriented (EMO) firms. <) 
7The SLDB used in this analysis has limitations in measuring the core-periphery wage disper-
sion because of insufficient industrial categories and the lack of firm-related information. The 
analysis of the core-periphery wage dispersion requires a greater than four-digit industrial classi-
fication, which no survey in Korea uses. Because of such limits, an intermediate sector is posited 
between the core-periphery dichotomy. This initial procedure yields a three-sector model drawn 
from cross-groupings of durables-nondurables and big-small firms: the core refers to firms of 
durables with 200 or more employees, the periphery contains those of nondurables with 199 or 
fewer employees, and the intermediate refers to those of durables with 199 or fewer (intermediate 
I) and of nondurables with 200 or more employees (intermediate II). However, preliminary 
analyses yielded statistically meangingless coefficients of these in·termediate sectors in multivari-
ate regression equations, which used the periphery sector as a dummy with controls for indi-
vidual endowments. Therefore, the final product is a two-sector dichotomy between the core and 
the periphery, with the intermediate sectors classified as part of the periphery. 
HEconomic studies use kinds of commodities instead of firms for such a classification: import-
substitution refers to commodities supplying over 90% of domestic consumption; import-
competition indicates industrial goods, which permit above \0% of market share to foreign 
products; and export goods refer to those for export markets rather than domestic consumption 
(see Krueger et al. 1978; Bhagwati 1978; Frank Jr., Kim, and Westphal 1975). 
However, commodities are not an adequate criterion to classify firms between domestic and 
export m~rkets because a reasonable firm tends to diversify its products to meet with the rapid 
changes of consumers' taste and market instability. T~us, firm should be an analytical unit of the 
market division. This analysis uses the ratio of firms' exports to total production to identify firms' 
sales markets, r~ferring to industrial export ratios(e). The intra-industry distribution of firms by 
e:ocport ratios shows a clustering pattern. The dividing points are selected as follows: food and 
beverage (0%, 5%), textile (40%, 90%), wood (0%, 50%), paper and printing (0%, 50%), 
machinery (10%, 50%), chemical and petroleum (0%, 30%), non-metallic mineral (0%, 50%), 
basic metal (0%, 50%), and others (0%, 70%) in SLDB. DC firms corresponds to the first 
partition, DE firms to the second partition, and exporting firms (EX) to the third. 
~For the purpose of convenience, 'domestic-market-oriented (DC and DE combined), will be 
abbreviated as DMO, and 'export-market-oriented (EX)' as EMO. DMO designates concentra-
tion on domestic markets, while EMO means an emphasis on export markets. 
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RESULTS OF ANAL YSIS 
Suppressed Economic Segmentation 
1. Comparing the Effects of Human Capital and Structural Variables 
In order to control wage variations by hours or weeks worked, to log hourly 
earnings are used as a common dependent variable in the earnings equations 
presented in Table 1. 
The two sets of earnings equations correspond to different groupings of 
control variables. The first set of earnings equations (panel I) displays the 
relative importance and changing rates of marginal effects of selected vari-
ables in additive, dummy terms. The four models in panel I compare the 
importance of human capital and structural variables in earnings determina-
tion. On the basis of the multivariate regression analyses in panel I, the 
second set (panel II) displays the changing effects of economic segmentation 
on earnings by controlling for the market division. The second set demons-
trates the extent to which the market division suppresses wage differentials by 
economic segmentations relative to what might exist in the absence of export-
promotion strategy. 
The first set allows us to assess the explanatory power of each model in 
terms of the R2 increment. The variance explained by human capital variables 
(model B) amounts to 60.30(0, which suggests the predominance of individual 
attributes in earnings determination in Korean labor markets. Adding the 
three structural variables to model B does not yield a sizable increment of the 
variance explained. The overall increment in the full-fledged model D is only 
1.4% compared to the variance explained by the four personal characteristics 
in model B. The preponderance of human capital in earnings equations 
stands in sharp contrast to the U.S. case. For instance, Bibb and Form 
reported that only 18.3% of wage variation in the U.S. is explained by 
human capital variables such as education, age, and work experience; but 
structural variables (i.e., industry, firm size, firm location, and unionization) 
account for over two-thirds of the variance explained (Bibb et al. 1977). In 
"'Major studies of earning functions tend to ignore the effects of hours worked, which may 
bring about misinterpretation (cf. e.g., Bibb and Form 1977; Beck et at. 1978; Wallace and 
Kalleberg 1981; Tolbert et al. 1978; Hodson 1977; Wright 1979). Pointing out this common 
failure, Sorensen argues that "earnings are function of wages per unit time and amount of time 
worked and are therefore heavily influenced by variations in hours and weeks worked" (Soren. 
sen, 1983, p.264). 
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TABLE 1. EARNINGS FUNCfIONS OF LOG HOURLY EARNINGS 
Models Panel Panel II 
Ind. Var. [A] [B] [C] [D] [E] [F] 
Human Capital 
Education 
12 yrs .239" 197*' .189" .194-' 187'-
(.038) (.039) (.039) (.039) (.039) 
14 & over .594'- .554" .541" .552'- .544" 
(.082) (.083) (.085) (.082) (.084) 
Tenure 
5-7 yrs .448-' .420" .406-' .427'- .416" 
(.046) (.046) (.046) (.045) (.046) 
Sex 
Female - .339" -.321" -307" -.326" -.308" 
(.027) (.028) (.029) (.027) (.028) 
Job Skill 
Craftsmen .567" .586" 595'- .585'- .593" 
(.086) (.085) (.088) (.085) (.088) 
Semi-skilled .095" .118" .118" .126" .127" 
(.035) (.036) (.036) (.036) (.036) 
Economic Segmentation 
Industry 
Durables" .091' .107" 
(.026) (.026) 
Firm Size 
Largeb .048 .078' 
(.027) (.029) 




Divisiond -.321" -.097" - .095" 
(.039) (.028) (.027) 
Constant 7.38 7.08 7.03 6.97 7.05 7.01 
R 6.10 60.34 61.07 61.76 61.24 62.05 
F stats. 68.70 104.57 93 .. 91 87.60 101.09 94.34 
'p < 0.05, '.p < 0.01. 
Note: Based on the earnings equation model. All variables are used in dummy terms in reference 
to basic categories. Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
a Durables dummy. 
b Larger firm dummy. 
C Based on the core-periphery dichotomy. Refer to footnote 8. 
d The market division is the dichotomy between DMO and EMO firms. Refer to footnote 
10. 
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contrast, models Band 0 in Table 1 suggest that human capital accounts for 
about 98% of the variance explained, with the remaining 2% explained by 
the three structural variables in Korea labor markets. This result is supportive 
of the fact that Korea's working-class labor market shares many similarities to 
an open market, in which worker wages are determined largely by personal 
endowments (see S0rensen 1983). 
This result is consistent with the state goal to strengthen the market-pricing 
mechanism for labor through maintaining a system of maximizing labor pro-
ductivity. Firms' internal labor markets in Korea have been organized in ways 
which promote turnover and interfirm mobility, in short, a high degree of 
market openness. The export strategy worked to reduce institutional barriers 
to turnover and mobility, such as interfirm and interindustry differences, 
while raising the importance of personal endowments in labor markets. This 
trend augmented the influence of social distinctions in job promotion and 
payment, which in a meritocratic social setting such as Korea is closely associ-
ated with the unequal distribution of individual endowments. 
In another respect, the preponderance of human capital in Korea is histor-
ical, because it reflects industrial customs and rules of payment schemes, 
particularly for production-line workers, which have existed since the colonial 
period. Wage determination in Korea's period of colonial industrialism prior 
to 1945 was firmly based on schooling and general skill, regardless of worker 
contributions to productivity. The lasting influence of colonial industrialism is 
enormous in this resper-t. More interestingly, however, Korean capitalists 
strengthened the importance of personal endowments even further in deter-
mining worker wages from the beginning of export-oriented industrialization. 
Korean capitalists apparently considered a payment scheme completely based 
on personal endowments as most profitable, unless labor shortages were to 
disturb it. 
Panel I displays three sources of structural earnings inequality: industry, 
firm size, and the market division. Two points are worth mentioning for a 
careful interpretation: the regression coefficients of industry and firm size are 
far smaller than those of individual endowments, and the statistical signifi-
cance of industry and firm size changes substantially with control for the 
market division. The latter point will be fully discussed later. Let us first 
consider the magnitude of industry and size effects on earnings. 
Industry has statistically significant (at .05 level) earnings effects in model 
C when firm size is controlled. However, its effect reaches only a 9.1 % level, 
amounting to just one-third of the sex effect. This magnitude of industry 
earnings effects is also quite small contrasted to such effects in U.S. labor 
markets. In Lawrence and Lawrence's research, for instance, industry 
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accounts for 21.2% of the differentials in U.S. worker earnings, and it 
accounts for up to 30% in a study by Dickens and Katz. Both of these studies 
control individual characteristics and locational variables in their multivariate 
regression analyses (Lawrence and Lawrence 1985; Dickens and Katz 1987). 
Industry wage differentials are ubiquitous, and Korea is no exception (see 
Lang et al. 1987). However empirical evidence supports the idea that the 
importance of industry in earnings determination is problematic in the Ko-
rean context. For one thing, only a meager increment of the variance (total 
increment of R2 = 0.44%) is explained by adding the industry variable to 
human capital. In fact, many studies on Korea's interindustry wage effects 
have reported that there were no substantial wage gaps between the heavy 
and light industries (Lee 1987;- Park and Park 1982), and that interindustry 
wage differentials did not show a consistent pattern with dual economists' 
industrial taxonomies (Lee 1984; Song 1986). For instance, in 1976 the 
wooden goods industry paid higher wages than the basic metal and chemical 
industries, and Korean food and beverage makers offered average wages 
equal to those in the machincry industry. This evidence strongly supports the 
argument that industrial differences are not a very important determinant of 
wage variation in Korea's highly open working-class labor market. 
Firm size is also weakly associated with worker earnings, generating about 
7.8% of relative advantage for large firms in the pooled model 0 with con-
trols for all variables used. This result needs more explanation. First, firm 
size turns out to be effective only between two size categories with controls 
for personal endowments: smaller and larger firms (see details in Appendix-
Models C and 0 of Tahle 4). More specifically, size wage effects do not exist 
between medium-size firms with 200 to 500 employees and larger firms with 
500 or more employees. Similar wage homogeneity exists among smaller firms 
employing less than 200 workers. It is surprising that the largest category of 
firms employing more than 500 workers, which absorbs over half of the total 
industrial work force in Korean manufacturing industries, does not bring 
sizable earnings advantages relative to the smallest category of firms with 99 
or fewer employees_ The magnitude of size wage effects is much smaller than 
in the Japanese case, for example, in which enterprise size is a primary 
source of structural inequality of worker earnings (Dore 1973; Koike 1983). 
It is noticeable that the market division has negative coefficients throughout 
earnings models A, 0, and F. In addition, the magnitude is approximately 
equal to that of industry and firm size wage effects in model 0 of Table 1, 
but the effect tripled in model A, accounting for a 32.1 % differential. These 
results mean that a modest earnings loss is predicted with horizontal mobility 
from domestic-market-oriented firms to export-market-oriented firms, other 
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things held constant. II 
Before estimating the wage effect of economic segmentation on the basis of 
the observation on changes of the significance levels and magnitudes of inter-
firm and interindustry wage effects, let us recapitulate our observations as to 
earnings functions in the working-class labor market as follows: 
[A) Earnings are dependent upon individual endowments to a far greater 
extent than in advanced capitalist countries. Structural effects account 
for only a meager portion of earnings variation in terms of R2 incre-
ment. These results are consistent with our agrument that most indust-
rial workers in Korea belong to a highly open labor market. 
[B] Three structural sources of earnings inequality are observed: industry, 
size, and market division. Industry and size effects, though statistically 
meaningful, are not very strong, compared to advanced countries such as 
the United States and Japan. The effects of market division are persis-
tently found almost equivalent to industry and size effects in their mag-
nitude but negative. 
2. The Market Division: Suppressing Economic Segmentation 
Our focus of analysis is now to measure the wage effects of economic 
segmentation, i.e., the earnings gaps between the core and periphery indust-
rial sectors. Earnings models C and 0 provide valuable information on sup-
ressed economic segmentation, i.e., ou~ main theme. 
Firm size is associated with 7.8% wage gains in the absence of policy 
impacts on labor markets in model D, but it becomes statistically meaningless 
in the presence of policy impacts in model C in Table 1. The changes of 
significance levels indicates that the market division completely eliminates the 
wage effects of firm size in Korean labor markets. Fi{m size wage effects are 
found nearly everywhere in the world (Bell and Freeman 1985) but these 
wage effects are completely eliminated in Korea by the market division, i.e., 
the labor-market outcome of export-promotion policies. In other words, 
Korea's export strategy has blurred the institutional boundaries of labor mar-
kets between large and small firms. The institutional boundary by firm-size is 
detrimental to the expansionist goal of large employers because it pressures 
them to pay workers above-market rates, particularly in recruiting new em-
ployees. Thus, large employers have benefitted from the absence of an insti-
tutional boundary by firm size, which has facilitated a unitary labor pool both 
"In monetary terms, the pure loss of monthly earnings amounts to a maximum of 20,000 Won 
(32.1% of the mean wages in DMO firms) in 1976. 
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for large and small firms. A unitary labor market also attenuated the dis-
advantage of small manufacturers by flattening wages for high-quality workers 
across firms. As a consequence, the absence of size wage differences has 
contributed to removing relative wage gains and thus has aided employers to 
hold down labor costs. 
Industry wage effects, though they do not change markedly, show a similar 
pattern. Control of policy impacts in model D increases the regression coeffi-
cient of the industry dummy by 1.6% and improves the significance level 
substantially. It was already argued in the previous analysis that the relatively 
small wage effects of industry (9.1 % in model C) were attributable to export-
promotion policies. In addition, the market division suppresses the magnitude 
of industrial wage effects by 15 percent. 12 In a similar perspective, the export 
strategy allowed employers in manufacturing industries to avoid paying work-
ers above-market rates by flattening industrial wage differentials to a substan-
tial degree. 
On the basis of these results, earnings models E and F in panel II estimate 
the extent to which the market division suppresses the core-periphery wage 
differentials. When wage effects of market division are eliminated in model 
F, economic segmentation produces a 16% wage differential between the core 
and the periphery sectors in Korea. A 16% wage differential is still very small 
as compared to those in other countries. In addition, it is noticeable that the 
core-periphery wage differentials are reduced by a substantial 25% under the 
influence of the market division in model E.13 In sum, these results lead us to 
contend that the export strategy has contributed to weakening institutional 
nonmarket forces such as economic segmentation, while preserving the pre-
ponderance of personal endowments in wage determination. Simply put, the 
export strategy has reinforced the market-pricing mechanism. 
If one compares the varying extent of institutional wage differentials by 
skill groups, the suppressed wage effects of economic segmentation are strik-
ing. Table 2 displays variations in the core-periphery earnings differentials 
under the influence of the wage effects of market division, as compared to 
the U.S. case. The market-pricing mechanism has dominated wage deter-
mination, particularly for semi-skilled assembly-line workers, who have com-
posed over four-fifths of the total work force in Korea's manufacturing indus-
tries during the past two decades of economic expansion. In other words, 
structural effects are completely eliminated and thus economic segmentation 
has no wage effect for the group of operatives, who make up the main work 
force in manufacturing industries. 
12Calculated from (10.7%-9.1%)/10.7% = 15%. 
13Calculated from (16%-12.3%)/16% = 14.9%. 
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TABLE 2. EARNINGS DIFFERENTIALS BY ECONOMIC SEGMENTATION. SKILL 
GROUPS, AND COMPARISON WITH THE U.S. LABOR MARKET (%) 
Category Korea U.S. 
Size" Industryh Economic Bibb & Hodson" 
Skill Segmentation" Form" 
groups" ReI." ReI. ReI. Abs. h Abs. Abs. 
Managerial Workers 
Craftsmen 15 0 23 30 20 34 
Production Workers 
Operatives 0 0 0 16 38 32 
Laborers 13 12 18 30 101 129 
Total 7.0 9.7 12.3 i 28.0 
Note: All individual variables are controlled when regression equations based on the proposed 
equation are operated separately for each demographic groups from the second to fourth 
columns. Zeros indicate cases in which regression coefficients fail the significant test. All 
other coefficients are statistically significant at 0.01 level. 
" Size dichotomy between large firms with 200 or more employees and small firms with 
199 or less employees. 
h Industry dichotomy between durables and nondurables. 
" The core-periphery differentials. 
" Ratios of core to periphery· earnings in absolute terms using 1972-73 QES (Bibb and 
Form. 1977). 
" Ratios of monopoly to competitive earnings in absolute terms using 1973 CPS (Hodson, 
1979) . 
.. The division between managerial and production-line workers is common in Korea. 
Managerial workers have a supervisionary power which production-line workers lack. 
g Relative earnings advantages. 
h Absolute earnings advantages. 
i Thc tolal carnings differential between the core-periphery. 
The first three columns demonstrate that, first, large firms show a 7% wage 
gain without controls for industry; second, the core sector shows a 9.7% wage 
gain without control for firm size; finally, economic segmentation engenders 
only a 12.3% earnings difference between the core and the periphery sectors. 
This magnitude contrasts with the 70% advantage of the core in absolute 
terms reported by Tolbert et af. (1980), and with the 40% advantage with 
controls for personal characteristics reported by Hodson (1979). Comparison 
of the absolute earnings gaps between Korea and the United States in the 
latter three columns also indicates that Korea's economic segmentation has 
had far smaller impacts on worker earnings, except for the craftsmen group 
which belongs to a relatively closed market. The craftsmen group shows 
almost an equivalent earnings gap as in the U.S. case because Korea's FILMs 
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clearly defines craftsmen as managerial workers. However, the impact on 
production-line workers, i.e., laborers and operatives, is negligible as com-
pared to the U.S. case: Korea's economic segmentation generates absolute 
wage differences at no more than half the U.S. level for operative workers 
and at less than one-fourth the U.S. level for laborers (5th and 7th columns). 
It is noticeable that earnings for operatives have no relationship with structu-
ral effects in earnings determination in relative terms (2nd to 4th columns for 
operatives). Indeed, the total 12.3% gain of the core sector is composed 
entirely of the relative advantages for craftsmen and laborers. This pattern 
indicates that worker earnings are determined completely by personal endow-
ments in the labor market for operatives. If 'going market rates' are defined as 
such a market condition with no· structural effects, earnings of operative 
workers tend to be decided at market rates. In other words, the market 
division significantly weakens the impact of economic segmentation on earn-
ings determination in general, leading to 'market rates' in the operatives' 
fabor market in particular. 
In sum, the export-promotion policy makes economic segmentation unin-
fluential in earnings determination in spite of the persistent, sharp divisions in 
product markets. However, it should be noted at this point that the export 
strategy has substituted the market division for economic segmentation as the 
leading source of earnings differentials in the Korean manufacturing indus-
tries. This represents a new pattern of structural inequality by the interven-
tionist state. We will turn to this newly emerging pattern of structural seg-
mentation· of labor markets. 
The Export Strategy: Generating A New Structural Segmentation 
1. Differentiation of Labor Markets 
For the past two decades of economic expansion, Korea's export strategy 
has restructured the working-class labor market in various ways. It significant-
ly affe~ted the distributional structure of industries and firms by the market 
division, promoting worker mobility in accordance with differing job opportu-
nities. Consequently, the distribution of industries and firms, as well as the 
composition of the labor force, differ substantially according to the division 
between domestic and export markets. This is not so surprising when we 
consider that the export strategy was the engine of creating employment and 
a favorable environment for expansion of firms.14 Table 3 presents a broad 
"Using the market division between the domestic and the export sectors, Cole and Westphal 
(1975) estimate that the export sector contributed about 40% of total employment generation 
during 1966-1970. 
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TABLE 3. DISTRIBUTION OF LABOR FORCE, INDUSTRY, AND FIRM SIZE BY MAR· 
KET DIVISION (%) 
Data & Year 1976 SLOB 
Market Division" Domestic Market Export Market 
Category DC DE EX 
Individual Variables 
Education (cum.) 
Elementary 13.5 10.2 19.1 
Middle 45.5 46.4 64.2 
High 88.8 88.9 %.2 
College 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Age (cum.) 
below 20 17.1 21.2 32.6 
below 25 41.9 55.6 76.2 
below 30 65.9 75.6 89.2 
Scx 
Male 79.1 61.4 43.2 
Female 20.9 38.6 56.8 
Job Skill 
Laborer 13.2 18.9 15.9 
Apprentice 14.0 19.7 21.2 
Semi-skilled 39.2 31.5 43.9 
Skilled 19.3 17.7 15.2 
Craftsmen 14.3 12.2 3.9 
Structural Variables 
Size 
5-199 50.6 34.7 22.7 
over 200 49.4 65.3 77.3 
Industry" 
Nondurables 50.5 43.3 64.4 
Durables 49.5 56.7 35.6 
Working Conditions 
Mean Monthly 
Wage" 62.338 57,907 43,624 
Median Wage 55,000 45,000 37,000 
Hours Worked 
(month) 252.7 253.1 267.2 
a Refer to footnote 10 for the definition of DC, DE, and EX. 
t. Refer to footnote 8 for the industrial categorization. 
" Wage unit is the Korean Won; 1 U.S. Dollar equaled 485 Won in 1976. 
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picture of the differentiation of labor markets by demographic groups, indus-
try, and firm types. 
First of all, the distribution of individual endowments according to the 
market division shows a regular pattern (see 'individual variables' in Table 3): 
as one moves from the domestic market (DC) to the export market (EX), 
workers' personal endowments become poorer. Exporting firms tcnd to em-
ploy less educated, younger, and less skilled workers, as compared to firms in 
the domestic market (fourth column). Simply put, exporting firms absorb 
workers who are positioned at the lower bottom of the labor-market pyramid. 
The proportion of college graduates is quite small (3.8%) and high-skilled 
workers (craftsmen) are meager (3.9%) in exporting firms. In contrast, firms 
concentrating on the .domestic maJ:ket (DC) tend to employ more educated, 
experienced, and skillcd workers, who are positioned in the middle or upper 
strata of the labor-market pyramid (second column). Also surprising is the 
domination of females in export-concentrating firms (57%) in contrast to the 
domination of male workers in domestic-market-oriented firms (79% in DC). 
In a word, the export strategy has played a crucial role in distributing workers 
unevenly by market division in terms of personal endowment. As one moves 
to the export market, we observe that the profiles of individual endowments 
become poorer and female workers are overrepresented. 
Regarding the distribution of industry and firm size (se.e 'structural vari-
ables' in Table 3), it is noteworthy that the durables industry tends to be 
associated with domestic consumption as opposed to the nondurables indus-
try, which is associated with the export market; in addition, large firms are 
concentrated in export-related markets, whereas small firms tend to produce 
goods for the domestic market. Thus, the pattern of industrial and firm-size 
distribution is also explained by the export strategy. 
Since the state has strategically encouraged nondurable industries to com-
pete with foreign manufacturers in international markets from the outset, it is 
natural that the nondurables tend to be export-market oriented. The state 
also allows the nondurables to enjoy a greater opportunity for enterprise 
expansion. In contrast, the durables. have developed a close linkage to the 
domestic market in parallel with policies of restricting domestic consumption. 
This dichotomy has resulted in an unique association between industry and 
firm size, as Figure 1 displays. 
Figure I expresses the ratios of large to small firms, and of durable to 
nondurable industries by the extent of firm involvement in the export market. 
With increases of the export ratio the proportion of large firms also increases 
but the level of durable industries declines. The two distribution lines cross 
around the mid-point, meaning that largc firms are more likely to manufac-
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FIGURE I. DISTRIBUTION OF INDUSTRY AND ESTABLISHMENT SIZE BY EX-
PORT RATIOS, 1976 
ture nondurables, and small firms are more related to durable goods. When 
market types are considered, small firms producing durable goods are domes-
tic-market oriented in nature, while large firms producing nondurable goods 
are oriented toward the export market. It is important to note that this 
unique associating of industry and size levels out the relative earnings advan-
tages. In other words, the export strategy makes structural earnings effects 
counteract each other by associating larger firms with the nondurables and 
smaller firms with the durables. Such a unique association explains the supp-
pressed economic segmentation, as demonstrated in the previous analysis. 
What has been described so far can be summarized as follows: 
[A} Firms producing only for domestic consumpti(;)fl (DC) and firms produc-
ing for both domestic and export markets (DE) are relatively similar, 
making a sharp contrast to export-concentrating firms (EX) in terms of 
the distribution of their labor force, industry, and firm size. 
[8] Specifically, the labor force employed in DMO firms has a relatively 
higher quality, while export-concentrating firms employ lower-quality 
workers 'on the average. 
[C] Small firms producing durable goods tend to be overrepresented in the 
domestic market, while large firms producing nondurable goods tend to 
be positioned in the export market. 
Consequently, the market division has a significant influence on working 








(I) DMO firms: Mean 7.647, Median 7.622, Standard dev .. 614. 
DMO firms: Mean 7.268, Median 7.286, Standard dev .. 566. 
DMO firms 
9 Log Hourly 
Earnings 
(2) The dependent variable is the log hourly earnings. The sample for domestic-market-oriented 
firms includes 630 workers, while 433 workers belong to the sample for export-market-
oriented firms. 
FIGURE 2_ COMPARISON OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF LOG HOURLY EARNINGS 
BETWEEN DOMESTIC-MARKET- AND EXPORT-MARKET-
ORIENTED FIRMS, 1976 
conditions as well. The bottom three lines in Table 3 clearly show the differ-
ences in labor market outcomes by the firms' market affiliation. As expected, 
working conditions become worse with an increasing emphasis on export 
production. Wages of export-concentrating firms equal to only 70% of those 
of firms producing goods for domestic consumption (DC). Employees in ex-
porting firms work almost 15 hours more than otherwise comparable workers 
per month. Simply put, workers of exporting firms have the longest work week 
and the lowest wages. 
Figure 2 displays two distinct patterns of earnings distribution according to 
the market division between the domestic and export markets in terms of log 
hourly earnings, showing the percentages of workers paid different amounts. 
Earnings differentials are quite noticeable in absolute terms, amounting to 
46% gains for workers in DMO firms opposed to otherwise comparable EMO 
workers. 15 The more concentrated and steeper the curve, the greater the 
15The ratio is from Wd/Wc, where Wd is the average wage of domestic-market-oriented firms 
and We is that of export-market-oriented firms. Log Wd/Wc = log Wd - log We = 7.647 -
7.268 = 0.379. Wd/Wc = 1.46, i.e .. 46% differential. 
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earnings equality: workers in EMO firms are more concentrated around the 
average wage than those in DMO firms. In terms of the standard deviation, 
earnings inequality among workers of EMO firms is 8% lower. 16 
From the neoclassical point of view, the larger payment and greater ine-
quality in DMO firms would be ascribed to differences in personal character-
istics, e.g., the higher proportion of educated, male skilled workers and, 
accordingly, the wider spectrum of job differentiation in DMO firms. Accord-
ing to our observation on labor force composition by the market division in 
Table 3, the neoclassical approach is adequate to interpret this earnings ine-
quality. However, the neoclassical approach fails to explain the differences of 
labor maket outcomes, since we also demonstrated the negative earnings 
effects of the market division per se with controls for diverse sources of indi-
vidual endowments in multivariate regression analyses. The market division 
itself is a structural factor of earnings inequality, which is not endogenous but 
exogenous to the earnings process. This means that the market division has 
emerged as an exogenous for.ce generating structural segmentation of labor 
markets in Korea. In fact, the export strategy has allowed a new pattern of 
structural segmentation of labor markets along with th.at exogenous force, 
while weakening the effects of economic segmentation substantially. 
2. The Predominance of the Market Division As a Structural Source of Ine-
quality 
As described above, economic segmentation is not important as a structural 
source of inequality in the Korean setting. As Figure 2 clearly shows, industry 
and size wage effects are extremely intertwined. Instead, the market division 
emerges as a leading Jactor in determining the relative gains Jor economic 
sectors created by the three-way combination oj industry, size, and market 
types. Consequently, the combined structure of industry and firm size, the 
two essential elements for economic segmentation in the present analysis, 
yields quite a different pattern of earnings differentials from what has becn 
reported by major studies on this subject (cf. Beck et 01. 1978; Tolbert- et oj. 
1980; Hodson and England 1985; Lawrence et al. 1985). Instead, the market 
division between the domestic and export markets has a decisive influence on 
the overall pattern of earnings advantages. There is one exception, however: 
the case of large-sized firm producing durable goods. 
Figure 3 displays a new pattern of earnings differentials among economic 
sectors. The earnings gains for durable industries and larger firms are so 
disrupted with control of market division as to virtually invalidate economic 
l"Calculatcd from (.614 - .5(6) X 100/.614 
Relative Earnings 
Differential (%) 
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Du. La. All Types 12% 
Nundu. Sm. Domestic 9% 
Du. Sm. & Nondu. La. Domestic 0% 
Du. Sm. & Nondu. La. Export -14% 




a Earnings differentials are based on the pooled model F in Table 1. The relative earnings gaps 
are obtained from comparison of three sets of regression coefficients for eight economic sec-
tors. The first and second sets are obtained from regression analyses concerning earnings gaps 
among domestic-market-oriented firms and analysis of earnings gaps between DMO and EMO 
firms provides the third set of coefficients. Each sector is used as a dummy term in reference 
to the sector of large-size firm of the nondurables. Regression equations control schooling, sex, 
job skill, and tenure dummies. All coefficients are statistically significant at 0.01 level except 
for two economic sectors (small firms of the durables and large firms of the nondurables, both 
of which belong to the domestic market), in which the structural effects are not existent (O'Yo). 
" The regression analysis finds two segments, in which worker earnings are completely depen-
dent upon individual endowments. This means that structural effects are nonexistent. 
FIGURE 3. EARNINGS DIFFERENTIALS BETWEEN ECONOMIC SECTORS OF 
THE THREE-FACTOR COMBINATION," 1976 
segmentation by industry and size in the Korean context. For instance, the 
market division generates about 33% wage differentials within small firms 
producing nondurables, and 14% wage differentials within large firms produc-
ing nondurables, Instead, earnings differentials, though somewhat irregular in 
case of larger firms producing durables, are rather consistent with the division 
between the domestic and the export markets, The new pattern of structural 
segmentation has been caused by the dual functions of market division per se: 
its negative earnings effects and its strong impacts on the distributional structure 
of the labor force, industry, and firm size, 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
By specifying the dual functions of the market division in earnings deter-
mination, the present analysis has illuminated how the market division 
through export promotion suppresses economic segmentation in terms of 
worker earnings. It has been argued that the market division is negatively 
associated with worker earnings and. strongly correlated with other types of 
variables considered in earnings equations. The market division also has a 
decisive impact on differentiation of the labor force, industry and firm size. 
These two functions intrinsic to the export strategy in Korea make industry 
and size wage effects counteract each other to a large extent, which reduces 
and weakens the effects of economic segmentation. In addition, the analysis 
highlights the emergence of a new pattern of structural segmentation of labor 
markets, which is an outcome of the export strategy itself. 
It should be emphasized that the export strategy in the earnings process 
leads to a highly open market, in which worker earnings are dependent upon 
personal endowments and structural effects are largely eliminated, particular-
ly in the operatives' labor market. These results support our main argument 
that the export-promotion policy has contributed to removing institutional 
nonmarket forces in wage determination, such as economic segmentation, but 
instead strengthened the trend toward wage competition. Maintaining the 
predominance of personal endowments in earnings process and·curbing 
structural wage advantages in labor markets are the structural imperative of 
the export strategy that the state assures the adaptability of the national 
economy to the world export market. The unlimited labor supply in Korea 
supported this state goal of weakening institutionalization of labor markets 
which is detrimental to the adaptive capacity. In fact, the Korean state 
achieved its goal to suppress the trend toward economic segmentation to 
which capitalist ~evelopment is prone. However, the state allowed a new 
pattern of structural inequality, though small in its magnitude (about 10% of 
wage differences), by the export strategy itself, i.e., a structural segmentation 
between the domestic and the export markets. 
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[APPENDIX] 
TABLE 4. THE PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS: MODELS OF EARNINGS EQUATION, 1976 
SLOB 
Models 
Ind. var. Model A Model B Model C Model 0 
Schooling 
middle .1007(.0368)" .0664(.0372) .0647.(.0373)' 
high . 1843( .0389)" .1212( .0409)" .1166(.0410)*' 
college .4948( .0498)" .4211 ( .0689)*" .4084( .0718)*' 
Tenure 
1-2 .1912(.0374)" .1742(.0371)" . 1750( .0375)" 
2-3 . 2420( .0402)" .2221 (.0400)" .2129(.0402)" 
3-5 . 3284(.0395)" .2956(.0400)" .2871(.0402)" 
5-7 .4142(.0453)" .3795(.0478)" .3665(.0467)" 
7-9 .4994(.0525)" .4540(.0531)" .4342(.0542)" 
over 9 .6634(.0535)" .6241(.0536)" .5958(.0560)" 
Sex 
female - .3736( .0279)" - .3200(.0431)" - .3120(.0305)" 
Job Skill 
apprentice - .2239(.0422)** - .2043(.0431)** -.2275(.0434)--
semi-skilled .1011(.0372)*' .3259(.0462)" .3271('0469)" 
skilled .2775(.0448)" .3259(.0462)" .3271 (.0469)" 
technician .4995(.0648)" .5409(.0649)" .5212( .0667)*' 
Industry 
food & bey. .3393(.0636)" .2335(.0676)' 
textile .1935(.0514)" .1914(.0511)'-
wood .4068( .1437)" .3968(.1429)' 
paper & printing .2551(.0652)" .1723(.0669)* 
chemicals .2980(.0593)** .2727(.0606)" 
minerals .2748(.0822)** .2522(.0819)* 
basic metal .3129(.1211)" .3511 (.1210)" 
machinery .3202(.0547)" .2801(.0552)" 
Size 
50-199 .0719(.0493)' .1274(.0503) 
200-499 .0981(.0499) .1832(.0523)-* 
over 500 .0938(.0478) .1764(.0509)*-
Market 
Division" - .2177( .0209) - .0819(.0171)*' 
Constant 7.94 7.15 6.82 6.97 
R2 9.23 60.99 62.57 62.99 
F Stats. 108.26 122.44 75.55 66.52 
'p < .05, **p < .01. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
a Triple dichotomy: DC, DE, and EX. Refer to Footnote 8. 
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